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HIS article provides an update of case law and legislative efforts
that have had, or will have, an impact on franchise and dealership
law in Texas and the Fifth Circuit. During the Survey period,
there were significant changes to the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC)
Rule on Franchising and the disclosures that franchisors make to poten-
tial franchisees.1 There were also noteworthy developments in the anti-
trust area: the United States Supreme Court reversed ninety-six year old
precedent related to vertical minimum resale price agreements 2 and the
Texas Supreme Court clarified the reach of the Texas Free Enterprise and
Antitrust Act of 1983. 3 While this update is not meant to detail all cases
that dealt with franchise and distribution law during the Survey period, it
does provide an overview with highlights of the most important legisla-
tive developments and cases.
II. FRANCHISE BASICS
A. THE AMENDED FTC FRANCHISE RULE
The long awaited Amended FTC Rule (the "Amended Rule") was re-
leased in early 2007. The new disclosures must be used for all franchises
offered or sold after July 1, 2008. The Amended Rule requires
franchisors to use a new disclosure format, now called a Franchise Disclo-
sure Document ("FDD") rather than a Uniform Franchise Offering Cir-
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cular ("UFOC").4 Franchisors will find many things to like about the
Amended Rule, including exemptions for high investment franchises and
for sales to certain high net worth franchisees. 5 This will eliminate com-
pliance obligations altogether for some franchisors.
The Amended Rule addresses many of the concerns raised by the
franchising community since the proposed Revised Rule was issued in
1999: Franchisors are now allowed to deliver disclosure documents elec-
tronically and must do so fourteen calendar days (rather than "business"
days) before the franchisee makes a payment to the franchisor or signs a
franchise related agreement.6 The "first personal meeting" requirement
is eliminated. Franchisors must give a prospective franchisee a completed
agreement seven days before signing if the franchisor has made a change
to the standard form of agreement provided with the disclosure docu-
ment.7  Financial performance representations (formerly earnings
claims), remain optional.8 New franchisors may continue to phase in the
financial audit requirement if they have not previously had audits.9
Franchisors are no longer required to disclose information about
franchise brokers.10
Franchisees are granted additional protection under the Amended
Rule as it prohibits the use of merger and integration clauses to deflect
liability for disclosures made in the FDD.11 Franchisors are also now re-
quired to disclose franchisor-initiated litigation, the use of confidentiality
clauses and the existence of franchisee associations. 12 Many franchisors
may find that registration takes longer this year as state examiners adjust
to the Amended Rule. The Amended Rule is part of a 398-page docu-
ment with which franchisors, their lawyers and state examiners will need
to become familiar to meet the new requirements.
III. PROCEDURE
A. JURISDICTION
The Dallas Court of Appeals explored the issue of personal jurisdiction
over out-of-state corporate officers in Wolf v. Summers-Wood, L.P.13 In
Wolf, the plaintiffs sued the president, Wolf, and vice-president, Reid, of
the defendant franchisor. 14 Wolf and Reid each filed special appear-
ances, arguing that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over
4. 16 C.F.R. § 436.3(a) (2008).
5. Id. § 436.8.
6. Id. § 436.2.
7. Id.
8. Id. § 436.5(s).
9. Id. § 436.5(u).
10. See 16 C.F.R. § 436.5(b).
11. Id. § 436.9.
12. Id. §§ 436.5(c), 435.5(t)
13. 214 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2007, no pet.). Haynes and Boone attorneys
Deborah S. Coldwell, Ben Mesches and Altresha Burchett-Williams served as counsel for
Linda Wolf and Julie Reid in this matter. Id. at 786.
14. Id. at 787.
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them.15 The trial court denied the special appearances, and Wolf and
Reid filed an interlocutory appeal. 16
The court first analyzed whether the court had general jurisdiction over
the officers. "General jurisdiction is present when the defendant's con-
tacts in a forum are continuous and systematic so that the forum may
exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the cause of ac-
tion did not arise from or relate to activities conducted within the forum
state."'1 7 Wolf and Reid argued that the fiduciary shield doctrine barred
the exercise of general jurisdiction. 18 "The fiduciary shield doctrine pro-
tects a nonresident corporate officer or employee from a trial court's ex-
ercise of general jurisdiction over the individual when all of the
individual's contacts with Texas were made on behalf of the employer."' 19
The plaintiffs argued that the officers used their franchisor corporate
form as a sham to perpetrate fraud, but the court noted that the plaintiffs
did not offer any evidence establishing how this was done.20 The court
held that, "[b]ecause appellees did not meet their burden of presenting
evidence of a corporate fiction or sham or that Wolf and Reid used the
corporate form to perpetrate a fraud, the burden did not shift to Wolf and
Reid to produce any evidence in support of their fiduciary shield argu-
ment."''z In addition, the court noted Wolf's and Reid's affidavits, which
stated that Wolf and Reid did not live in Texas and had only remote per-
sonal contacts with Texas. Outside of those, their only contacts with
Texas were made solely on behalf of their company.22 Therefore, the
court concluded that the court lacked general jurisdiction over Wolf and
Reid. 23
The court went on to analyze specific jurisdiction. "[S]pecific jurisdic-
tion is established if the nonresident defendant's alleged liability arises
from or is related to activity conducted within the forum."'24 Wolf and
Reid claimed that because they were not parties to the contract individu-
ally the breach of contract claim could give rise to specific jurisdiction.
Additionally, they argued that the evidence was legally and factually in-
sufficient to support specific jurisdiction on the tort claims.2 5 The court
agreed. Because Wolf and Reid had not signed the contract as individu-
als, specific jurisdiction did not arise from the breach of contract claim.2 6
Additionally, the plaintiffs did not allege specific individual acts by Wolf
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 788.
18. Id. at 789.
19. Id. at 790.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 790-91.
23. Id. at 791-92.
24. Id. at 789.
25. Id. at 792.
26. Id.
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or Reid in support of their tort claims.27 After concluding that specific
jurisdiction did not exist, the court of appeals reversed the trial court and
ordered that Wolf and Reid be dismissed from the case.28
Personal jurisdiction was also an issue in Lathrop v. Personalysis
Corp.29 In Lathrop, the defendant, Kenneth Lathrop, a Washington state
resident, worked for a Washington-based authorized distributor and li-
censee of the plaintiff, a Texas company. 30 The plaintiff provided special
software that performed personality analysis, and Lathrop provided con-
sulting services based upon the results. 31 Lathrop signed multiple non-
compete and non-disclosure forms while working in Washington. 32 When
Lathrop left his employer and developed and marketed his own personal-
ity test, the plaintiff sued in Texas. 33 Lathrop filed a special appearance,
arguing that he did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Texas.34
The court analyzed Lathrop's contacts with Texas to determine if spe-
cific jurisdiction existed.35 The court found that all written agreements
between Lathrop and his Washington state employer before August 16,
2001, contained forum selection and choice of law provisions designating
Washington State, while Lathrop's first agreement directly with the plain-
tiff on August 16, 2001, contained a Texas choice of law clause and no
forum selection clause.36 The court found that the deletion of the forum
selection clause that designated Washington provided some evidence that
jurisdiction in Texas was anticipated.37 The court also analyzed Lathrop's
training visits to Texas, and found that these visits were rooted in Lath-
rop's relationship with the plaintiff.38 The court noted Lathrop's tele-
phone calls to Texas and his receipt of confidential information while in
Texas.39 The court concluded that Lathrop failed to negate all bases of
personal jurisdiction, and that the evidence was legally and factually suffi-
cient to support a finding of specific jurisdiction.40
B. CLASS AcTIONS
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Gill,41 the Thirteenth Court of Appeals of
Texas reviewed a trial court's decision certifying the statewide class. Ex-
xon filed an interlocutory appeal following class certification. The appel-
27. Id.
28. Id. at 793.
29. No. 14-06-00074-CV, 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 9423 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] Oct. 31, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.).
30. Id. at *1.
31. Id. at *1-2.
32. Id. at *2-5.
33. Id. at *5.
34. Id. at *5-6.
35. Id. at *13, 23.
36. Id. at *14-15.
37. Id. at *15.
38. Id. at *16-17.
39. Id. at *22-24.
40. Id. at *26.
41. 221 S.W.3d 841 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2007, pet. filed).
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late court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in certifying
the class.42 The plaintiffs were three current and former Exxon service-
station dealers who participated in Exxon rebate programs during the
1990s. 43 Under various forms of rebate programs, dealers received incen-
tives for activities such as high sales volume or staying open later hours. 44
The plaintiffs claimed that Exxon cheated them out of the economic ben-
efit of the rebates by adding the cost of the rebate programs to the price
that the dealers paid for gasoline. 45 The court certified a class consisting
of
all persons, partnerships, corporations, associations and entities
which are and/or were at the material times Exxon-branded retail
service station dealers who owned or operated Exxon branded retain
motor fuel stores in the state of Texas and who entered into a stan-
dardized contract or agreement with ExxonMobil ... [, with] mate-
rial times [meaning] the period during which the rebate programs...
were in effect in Texas. 46
The trial court's order included a seven-page trial plan, which outlined a
proposal for trying the class action and Exxon's defenses. 47
The trial court concluded that the class satisfied the four threshold con-
ditions for class certification: 1) numerosity, 2) commonality, 3) typicality
and 4) adequacy of representation-a decision reviewed by the appellate
court for abuse of discretion.48 The trial court certified the class under
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b)(3), which requires that common
questions of law or fact predominate over those affecting only individual
members, and that class treatment of the action be superior to other
methods of adjudicating the controversy. 49 Exxon argued that although
the trial court's order certified a class of plaintiffs with contract claims,
the plaintiffs' claims were instead fraud, which would make it difficult for
the class representatives to prove that each member of the class relied on
a false representation. 50 The trial court's order stated that the class was
certified on 1) breach of the sales agreements; 2) breach of the UCC duty
of good faith; and 3) breach of rebate promises.5 1 The appellate court
had to determine what type of action-whether tort or contract-the trial
court certified.
First, based on the large number of potential plaintiffs, the court easily
concluded that the class satisfied the numerosity requirement.52 The
court then addressed Exxon's argument that the class lacked commonal-
42. Id. at 849.
43. Id. at 845.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 846 (quoting plaintiffs' motion for class certification).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 847 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(3)).
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 848 (citation omitted).
52. Id. at 849.
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ity because the class failed to identify an issue that was applicable to the
class as a whole and subject to generalized proof.53 Exxon alleged that
the first two causes of action certified by the trial court-breach of the
sales agreement and breach of the duty of good faith-were actually a
single cause of action for breach of the open price terms in the sales
agreements. 54 Exxon then asserted that the Texas Supreme Court ruling
in Shell Oil Co. v. HRN,55 precluded the plaintiffs' cause of action for
breach of the open-price terms.56
The appellate court agreed with Exxon (and even the plaintiffs' own
classification of the claims) that the plaintiffs' first two claims were the
same cause of action for purposes of class certification.57 The court dis-
agreed, however, that HRN precluded the plaintiffs' claims.58 The court
stated that the "reality of this case is that the plaintiffs have sued for
more than breach of the open-price term under the standardized sales
agreements. They have also sued for breach of the promise to provide
economic benefits under the rebate programs. '59 The court thus con-
cluded that the plaintiffs in fact shared the common issue of whether
HRN and a comment to the applicable statutory provision precluded or
allowed recovery. 60
The court next addressed Exxon's argument that the class lacked com-
mon proof and common answers. The court found that the class had a
common contested liability issue and that the trial court's order identified
different types of class-wide evidence offered by the plaintiffs. 61 The
court stated that whether Exxon was telling the truth about recouping the
rebates was a question that would be determined on a class-wide basis
and in fact described the situation as "pretty close to an ideal situation,
where class treatment will involve class-wide evidence that has at least
the demonstrated potential to uniformly resolve hundreds of disputes. 62
The court then assessed whether controlling substantive issues would
predominate over individual issues, which the Texas Supreme Court has
deemed "one of the most stringent prerequisites to class certification. 63
The court had to determine whether the common issues predominated by
identifying substantive issues in the case and determine if the predomi-
nating issues were common to the class.64 The court found that the trial
court answered the predominance question within its discretion, and that
53. Id.
54. Id. at 850.
55. 144 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2004).
56. Exxon Mobil, 221 S.W.3d at 850.
57. Id. at 851.
58. See id. at 851-52.
59. Id. at 852.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 853-54.
62. Id. at 854-55.





"it is not necessarily an abuse of discretion to certify a class that might
ultimately fail."'65
Exxon argued that it would not be able to assert defenses against indi-
vidual class members. 66 The court disagreed with Exxon's argument that
it would need to cross-examine each class member individually to deter-
mine the class member's individual knowledge of the facts. 67 The court
viewed the focus of the case as being on Exxon's conduct, despite there
being some questions that would have to be answered individually, such
as damages.68
Exxon claimed that the class representatives did not satisfy the typical-
ity requirement because the plaintiffs were not typical of the many Texas
dealers who purportedly knew that Exxon factored the cost of rebates
into gas prices. 69 The court found that even if some evidence on this issue
was conflicting, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that the class representatives satisfied the typicality requirement.70 The
court went on to find that the class representatives were adequate be-
cause there was no actual evidence of any class-member conflict and Ex-
xon did not show the trial court abused its discretion.71
Finally, the court assessed whether class treatment would be superior
to other methods of adjudication and the sufficiency of the trial plan. 72
Exxon argued that class treatment was not superior because the plaintiffs
could pursue their claims individually and doing so was economically fea-
sible.73 The trial court found that the nature and complexity of the plain-
tiffs' claims, along with the cost of litigation, made class treatment
superior, and the appellate court found no abuse of discretion.74 The
court found that the trial plan was sufficient and rejected Exxon's argu-
ments of a conflict between the individual class members and Exxon's
difficulty in defending itself.75 In conclusion, the appellate court found
that the trial court conducted a rigorous analysis in accordance with Rule
42 and found no grounds for reversal.76
C. ARBITRATION AND JURY WAIVER PROVISIONS
Arbitration and jury waiver provisions are often analyzed together. A
franchise or license agreement many times contains a jury waiver provi-
sion when the parties agree to arbitrate in lieu of litigating the dispute
before a court. In Wasserman v. We the People Forms & Services Centers
65. Id. at 857 (citing Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 858-61.
69. Id. at 861.
70. See id. at 861-62.
71. Id. at 862-63.
72. Id. at 863 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(3)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 864.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 864-65.
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USA, Inc.,77 plaintiffs Martha and Marty Wasserman challenged the de-
fendants' motion to dismiss or stay pending arbitration. In 2004, the Was-
sermans entered into a franchise agreement with Ira Distenfield, who
granted the Wassermans the exclusive right to open and operate We The
People ("WTP") stores in Hildalgo and Starr counties. The franchise
agreement contained a choice of law provision (California), a mandatory
arbitration clause, and a jury waiver clause. 78
The Wassermans filed suit against Distenfield (and the successor Dollar
Financial Group, Inc.) for fraud-based claims, alleging that defendants
failed to satisfy their contractual obligations under the franchise agree-
ment.79 The defendants moved to dismiss or to stay pending arbitration
based on the jury waiver and arbitration clauses; the Wassermans did not
dispute the wording of the franchise agreement or contest that their
claims fell within the scope of the clause. As such, the district court ad-
dressed two issues: (i) whether under the franchise agreement the Was-
sermans validly waived their right to a jury trial, and (ii) whether the
arbitration clause was enforceable. 80 The district court concluded in the
affirmative to both issues. 81
The Wassermans argued that they did not waive their right to a jury
because the waiver was not a "knowing and intelligent act," as required
under California law (which is substantially similar to Texas law). The
Wassermans argued they had limited experience with arbitration and did
not realize they were waiving their right to a jury. The district court dis-
agreed.8 2 The franchise agreement "unequivocally" stated the jury
waiver separate and apart from the arbitration provision: "[tlhe parties
... waive the right to a jury trial in any action or proceeding based on, or
arising out of, this Agreement. '8 3 Based on the unambiguous language
of the franchise agreement and the Wassermans' failure to rebut the
franchise agreement's plain language, the district court concluded that
"they 'knowingly and intelligently' waived their right to a jury trial by
signing the Franchise Agreement. '84
After the court concluded that the jury waiver provision was valid, the
Wassermans argued that the arbitration provision was substantively and
procedurally unconscionable. The Wassermans contended that the "hid-
den costs" of arbitration rendered the clause substantively unconsciona-
ble.8 5 The district court again disagreed and highlighted the disclosure
made in the arbitration provision: "arbitration will be binding under the
rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA), and that '[e]ach
77. No. 3:07-CV-0606-D, 2007 WL 2228617 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2007).










party will bear its own costs and expenses in preparing for and participat-
ing in the arbitration.' 8 6 The court pointed out that the Wassermans
could access a complete list of the AAA's commercial arbitration rules,
including the specific costs, on the AAA's website. Furthermore, the ar-
bitration clause in Wasserman, as compared to other authorities, made
clear that the parties would split the costs of the arbitrators' fees. Moreo-
ver, the Wassermans acknowledged that their bargaining power was not
substantially different from the defendants'. The district court also re-
jected the Wassermans' argument that their costs of travel and lodging in
California were "burdensome enough to render the arbitration provision
unenforceable. '87 The court emphasized two points: (i) the defendants
would be required to incur the same costs if the dispute was litigated in
Dallas; and (ii) because the forum selection clause designated California,
the Wassermans would be required to incur the same or similar travel and
lodging costs even if they resolved this dispute in California courts, rather
than arbitration. 88
Similarly, the district court rejected the Wassermans' argument that the
arbitration provision was procedurally unconscionable due to costs of ar-
bitration.89 The district court held that because the arbitration provision
was not substantively unconscionable, a showing of procedural uncon-
scionability was insufficient to support the Wassermans' challenge to en-
forcing the arbitration clause.90 In conclusion, the district court granted
the defendants' motion and stayed the case pending the outcome of
arbitration.91
The plaintiffs in Singh v. Choice Hotel International, Inc.92 also chal-
lenged an arbitration clause based on the unconscionability defense. In
2003, Kikramjit Singh and other individual entered into a franchise agree-
ment with Choice Hotels for the operation of a "Quality Inn and Suites
Airport" hotel in Amarillo, Texas (the "franchise Agreement"). In year
one, Singh grossed $1.29 million in revenues. In 2005, Singh grossed
$969,741.98 in revenues. Singh attributed the decline to Choice Hotels'
dropping of the "Airport" designation.93 After Singh complained about
its listing in the Tour Book as "Quality Inn & Suites," Choice Hotels
inspected Singh's franchise, gave it a failing grade, and instructed Singh to
make more that $100,000 in repairs. Singh alleges that when he was una-
ble to make the repairs, Choice Hotels terminated the franchise
agreements. 94
86. Id.
87. Id. at *4.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *5.
91. Id.
92. No. 3:07-CV-0378-D, 2007 WL 2012432, at *1 (N.D. Tex. July 11, 2007).
93. Id.
94. Id. at *2.
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Singh sued Choice Hotels for breach of contract and violations of the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act ("DTPA").
Choice Hotels moved to dismiss or to stay pending arbitration in accor-
dance with the arbitration provision in the franchise agreement. Singh
argued that the arbitration provision was void as unconscionable. The
district court agreed to stay the litigation pending the completion of
arbitration.95
The court noted that under Maryland law, "an unconscionable bargain
or contract is one characterized by 'extreme unfairness' that is made evi-
dent by 'one party's lack of meaningful choice, and contractual terms that
unreasonably favor the other party."' 96 Singh contended that the arbitra-
tion clause was so one-sided as to be unconscionable and therefore unen-
forceable. 97 Singh specifically noted that, pursuant to the arbitration
provision, the arbitration was to occur at Choice Hotels' headquarters,
was optional for Choice Hotels but mandatory for Singh, precluded cer-
tain claims, was cost prohibitive, and impermissibly denied Singh the
right to a jury trial.98
The court equated the forum selected in the arbitration clause to a
"specialized kind of forum-selection clause." 99 Singh could not meet his
"heavy burden of proof" to avoid the forum agreed to in the arbitration
provision.100 Likewise, the district court was not persuaded by Singh's
lack of mutuality argument. It noted that "[u]nder Maryland law, an ar-
bitration clause is not considered invalid as a matter of law when one
party is allowed to litigate certain specific claims instead of having to sub-
mit them to arbitration. '" 10 1 Under the arbitration provision, Choice Ho-
tels was allowed to "litigate any claim for indemnification, unauthorized
use of its marks, or money owed under the Franchise Agreement.' 10 2
The court concluded that the mere fact the parties struck an unequal bar-
gain was not grounds for invalidating the mandatory arbitration clause. 10 3
The district court also rejected Singh's argument that the arbitration
clause was unconscionable because it precluded discovery. The court
noted that the clause was not one-sided, but that both parties were re-
stricted to certain discovery.10 4 However, the parties could agree to cer-
tain forms of discovery by mutual consent. Moreover, although Choice
Hotels did not dispute that the arbitration costs could exceed $30,000, the
95. Id. at *6.
96. Id. at *3 (citing Walther v. Sovereign Bank, 872 A.2d 735, 743-44 (Md. 2005)).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *4.
100. Id.
101. Id. at *5 (citing Walther, 872 A.2d at 748 ("We do not find that exceptions to the
arbitration agreement, which allow [one party] to litigate certain specific claims instead of
having to submit them to arbitration, are so unfairly oppressive as to make the agreement
unconscionable.")).
102. Id.
103. Id. at *5.
104. Id. at *6.
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court held that Singh did not meet his burden of proving that the fees for
arbitration were excessive when compared with potential litigation costs.
Singh's brief and supporting affidavit did not contain a real cost-differen-
tial analysis. 10 5
Singh argued the denial of a trial by jury was unconscionable because
the arbitration clause did not expressly advise him in writing that he was
waiving his right to a jury trial. The court denied this argument because
neither federal nor Maryland law required that the arbitration clause pro-
vide jury waiver notice to Singh. The court concluded that the arbitration
clause clearly and unambiguously provided that, with certain inapplicable
exception, "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
Agreement... will be sent to final and binding arbitration. '10 6 The court
noted that the absence of express language in the clause waiving the right
to jury trial did not support a different result. Therefore, the district
court granted Choice Hotels' motion to compel arbitration and dismiss or
stay litigation, and the court ordered the parties to participate in binding
arbitration in Maryland in accordance with the terms of the franchise
agreement. 107
In determining the scope of an arbitration clause, both contract and
tort claims may be subject to arbitration depending on the language of
the specific arbitration provision. In Sharifi v. AAMCO Transmissions,
Inc.,10 8 plaintiff Gholamreza Sharifi ("Sharifi" or "Plaintiff") sued defen-
dant AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. ("AAMCO") to recover for various
tort claims arising from the aborted sale of Sharifi's AAMCO franchise.
In 1997, Sharifi and AAMCO entered into a franchise agreement for the
operation of an AAMCO repair center. The franchise agreement re-
quired AAMCO to approve the sale of the business from Plaintiff to a
third party. "[B]efore the sale could take place" Sharifi was required to
meet "certain conditions precedent," including that all financial obliga-
tions were fully paid and satisfied. 10 9
In 2005, third party Steen Automotive, Inc. and its President, John F.
Steen, Jr., agreed to purchase the franchise by executing an agreement of
sale with Sharifi. The agreement of sale provided a closing date no later
than March 25, 2005. Subject to the satisfaction of the conditions prece-
dent, "AAMCO approved the purchase on February 23, 2005."' 0
Between the approval of the purchase and the closing date, Steen had
many communications with AAMCO's franchise administration director.
Based on these communications, Sharifi alleged that AAMCO discour-
aged Steen from consummating the pending sale with Sharifi, and, in-
stead, to purchase other, less expensive AAMCO franchises in Florida.
Sharifi further alleged that AAMCO "conspired to 'kill the deal' by 'falsi-
105. Id. at *8.
106. Id. at *10 (quoting the Franchise Agreement).
107. Id. at *11.
108. No. 3:07-CV-0718-D, 2007 WL 1944371, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2007).




fying the financial obligations' Sharifi owed AAMCO and by waiting un-
til three days before scheduled closing to notify Sharifi of his outstanding
debt in the amount of $85,312.36."111 Plaintiff alleged that based on the
unpaid, falsified financial obligations, the sale did not close. As such,
Plaintiff sued AAMCO for civil conspiracy, fraud and misrepresentations,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with
business opportunities, and intentional interference with existing
contract.
112
In determining whether Plaintiff's claims were subject to arbitration,
the court analyzed whether the tort claims were "so interwoven" with the
provisions of the franchise agreement that the tort claims could not be
maintained without reference to the franchise agreement.1 13 Holding
that the tort claims were "so interwoven," the court concluded that plain-
tiff's tortious interference claims were arbitrable issues. Likewise, the
court held that AAMCO could not have committed fraud or conspiracy
"but for the contractual relationship." Therefore those claims were also
subject to arbitration.114
IV. TERMINATION OF THE FRANCHISE RELATIONSHIP
To be successful in a claim of wrongful termination under the Texas
boat dealer law's prohibition on termination without good cause, the
dealership agreement must be in writing.115 In East Hill Marine Inc. v.
Rinker Boat Co., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's order granting summary judgment to Rinker Boat Co. and Gavin
Hunt, the appellees. 1 16 East Hill Marine and Joe Stark, two boat dealers,
brought suit against Rinker Boat Co. During the early 1990s, Stark be-
came an authorized Rinker Boats dealer in Fort Worth. There was no
written dealer agreement and Stark did not pay any money to Rinker
Boat Co. in exchange for the agreement. In September 2004, Rinker
Boat Co. sent Stark a letter informing him that they were terminating the
dealer agreement because of unsatisfactory sales performance and sub-
par performance in the areas of customer service and satisfaction. In
March 2004, Rinker Boat Co. entered into a verbal dealer agreement
with East Hill Marine. Rinker made the same representations to East
Hill Marine as it made to Stark. Rinker told East Hill Marine that it
would be the exclusive Rinker dealer in North Dallas for as long as East
Hill Marine wanted to be the North Dallas Dealer. East Hill Marine did
not pay Rinker to become an authorized dealer. Larry Cochran, the
president of East Hill marine, requested a written agreement, but Brinker
did not have a written agreement and was not willing to provide with him
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *3.
114. Id. at *5.
115. East Hill Marine, Inc. v. Rinker Boat Co., 229 S.W.3d 813, 817 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 2007, pet. denied).
116. Id. at 821.
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one. In November 2004, Rinker terminated East Hill Marine's dealership
status. In December 2004, Stark and East Hill Marine sued for breach of
their dealer agreements and for violations of the Texas Occupations
Code.117
The Texas Occupations Code (the "Code") restricts a boat manufac-
turer from terminating a dealer's agreement "unless there is good cause
for the termination."' 118 Pursuant to section 2352.052 of the Code, the
parties must enter into an agreement that contains, among other things,
"provisions for termination or nonrenewal of the agreement" and dispute
resolution procedures. 119 The court stated that "[w]hile appellants may
be correct that the Occupations Code was designed to protect small boat
dealers from large and powerful manufacturers, the clear language of the
statute requires both parties to enter into a written agreement."1 20 The
court did not agree that various pieces of correspondence, purchase or-
ders, purchase invoices and other documents were sufficient to constitute
written agreements between the dealers and Brinker because the docu-
ments did not satisfy the "Occupation Code's eight requirements for writ-
ten agreements.1 2 1 The appellate court found that summary judgment in
favor of Brinker Boat Co. was proper because the boat dealer's law con-
tained in the Texas Occupation Code applies only to written
agreements.122
While the Second Court of Appeals was considering termination under
Texas' boat dealer's law, the Third Court of Appeals was considering ter-
mination and transfer under Texas' motor vehicle dealer's law. In Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Bray,123 the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed part
of the trial court's order and remanded certain issues to the Motor Vehi-
cle Division of the Texas Department of Transportation for further pro-
ceedings. 12 4 Hays Mills owned and operated a dealership known as
Eaton Motor Company in Athens, Texas for more than thirty-seven
years. He decided to retire and agreed to transfer his dealership to
Charles Elliott, who owned and operated Elliott Chevrolet, a competitor.
An employee in GM's Dealer Network and Development Division con-
tacted both Mills and Eaton and encouraged them to engage in the trans-
action because of GM's plan to consolidate GM products in one
dealership in Athens. Mills and Elliott entered into an asset and stock
purchase agreement for the purchase of Eaton Motor Company, which
was contingent on GM's approval of the transfer.125
117. Id. at 815.
118. Id. at 816 (citing TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2352.053(a) (Vernon 2004)).
119. Id. at 817 (citing TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2352.052(a) (Vernon 2004)).
120. Id. (citing § 2352.051) (emphasis in original).
121. Id. (citing § 2352.052(a)).
122. Id. at 817-18.
123. 243 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.).
124. Id. at 680.
125. Id. at 680-81.
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GM did not approve the transfer of Mills' dealership to Elliott. Elliott
did not meet GM's requirements to be a Multiple Dealer Operator be-
cause he had low sales scores. In response to GM's rejection of the trans-
fer application, Mills filed a protest with the Motor Vehicle Division of
the Texas Department of Transportation (the "Division"). Mills and Elli-
ott contended that the sales scores were affected by market forces that
dealers are unable to control. Mills and Elliott asserted that GM violated
the Texas Occupations Code because Elliott was a qualified transferee
under a provision that provides that "[a] manufacturer or distributor may
not unreasonably withhold approval of an application [for transfer of a
dealership]. '126 The Division found that GM unreasonably denied the
transfer application because of GM's use of unwritten standards where
the statute specified that written standards were to be used and that Elli-
ott was qualified, which forced GM to accept the transfer. 127 GM sought
judicial review of the decision.' 28
GM asserted that the statute's requirement that a manufacturer use
written standards to determine whether a transferee is qualified "simply
describes one situation in which a manufacturer's rejection of a transfer
applicant would be unreasonable per se" and that the legislature's addi-
tion of the words "if any" to the list of transfer considerations reflected
the legislature's understanding that not all manufacturers "have written,
reasonable, and uniformly applied standards for transfer applicants.'
' 29
The appellate court generally agreed with GM's interpretation but re-
jected the argument that the legislature had only provided "a bright-line
test for one specific factual situation. 130 The court found that a manufac-
turer who rejects a transfer applicant because of "unwritten, unreasona-
bly and disparately applied standards" did not have as good an argument
as a manufacturer who rejected an applicant for other reasons, such as
"unacceptable moral character."'131 The appellate court did not answer
definitively whether GM's action was unreasonable, but remanded the
case to the Division for it to determine whether GM unreasonably denied
the transfer application using the court's construction of the statute.
132
The court also addressed GM's arguments concerning the Division's
finding that Elliott was qualified.133 The court distinguished the question
of whether Elliott was qualified with the question of "whether a prospec-
tive transferee is acceptable to [a manufacturer or distributor]."1 34 The
court found that while a manufacturer has the authority to reject a trans-
feree as long as its rejection is not unreasonable, the Division has the
authority to decide whether a dealer is qualified in the event of a protest.
126. Id. at 683 (citing TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. 2301.359 (Vernon 2004)).
127. Id. (citing TEx. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2301.751(a), (c) (Vernon 2004)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 685.
130. Id. at 685-86.
131. Id. at 686.
132. Id.




The court reached this conclusion because of the power granted to the
Division under section 2301.101 of the Texas Occupations Code. 135 The
court found that the Division's conclusion was supported by the facts.
Thus, while holding that the Division erroneously construed section
2301.059 of the Texas Occupations Code and remanded the case to the
Division for a determination on that section, the court affirmed the rest
of the trial court's order.1 36
V. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
As with any claim, it is important to ensure that the proper party is
asserting a claim for federal or state trademark infringement. In Mul-
timin USA, Inc. v. Wales International, Inc., plaintiffs Multimin USA, Inc.
and Warburton Technology Ltd. ("Warburton") sued several defendants,
including Walco International, Inc. ("Walco"), for federal trademark in-
fringement, dilution, infringement of common-law trademark, common
law misappropriation, and other state law claims. 137 Warburton is the
owner of several trademarks for multimin, a liquid solution of trace min-
erals injected into animals to correct mineral deficiencies. In March 1999,
Warburton and Walco entered into a distribution agreement, whereby
Walco became a distributor of multimin for the entire United States.
During the term of the distribution agreement, Warburton gave Walco
confidential information and trade secrets regarding multimin. In 2003,
the distribution agreement between Warburton and Walco expired. In
February 2003, Warburton entered into a distribution agreement with
Multimin USA, whereby Multimin USA became the exclusive distributor
in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. In addition, Warburton pur-
ported to assign to Multimin USA the trademark and marketing rights
for multimin in the United States.138
Following expiration of the distribution agreement with Walco, Walco
bottled and sold 'Mineral Max,' which allegedly had the same ingredients
as multimin. In late 2003 or early 2004, Warburton formulated a new
solution called 'Multimin Cattle'. In February 2006, the defendants, in-
cluding Walco, bottled and sold 'Mineral Max II," which allegedly con-
tained "the same formula as Multimin Cattle except for the
preservative. "139
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss Multimin USA's claims for
federal trademark infringement and dilution, and common law trademark
infringement, among other claims, based on lack of standing. The parties
stipulated regarding dismissal of the other claims and presented the in-
135. Id.
136. Id. at 694 (noting also that the Division should consider whether the dispute was
rendered moot by Elliott's selling the dealership to a third party).
137. No. 4:06-CV-260-A, 2007 WL 1686511, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 8, 2007).
138. Id.
139. Id. at *2.
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fringement claims to the court for consideration. 140
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas
noted that although the trademark owner or registrant is generally the
proper plaintiff, an assignee of a trademark may also be a plaintiff.
141
However, the transfer of rights must actually constitute an assignment. In
order to vest title to the trademark in a party:
the transfer must be absolute and must relate to the entire rights in
the trademark. In contrast to an assignment, a license to use a mark
does not pass title to the trademark because it is a transfer of limited
rights, less than the whole interest which might have been
transferred. 142
Defendants argued that, at most, Multimin USA had an exclusive license,
but that this license did not transfer or assign the right to sue. The district
court agreed. 143
Both parties cited ICEE Distributors, Inc. v. J & J Snack Foods
Corp.,1 44 which discussed standing to sue under the Lanham Act.
One of the ways that the law extends the benefits of trademarks and
protects incentives to develop them is by allowing trademark owners
to license the use of their marks to distributors and franchisees. Such
licensing allows more information to be conveyed to more consum-
ers without the licensor having to risk losing title to its mark.
It would be antithetical to the basic principles of trademark law to
extend to a licensee the rights of an assignee without caution, since
deeming a licensee an assignee would allow the assignee to hold the
registered trademark owner liable under trademark law, rather than
simply under contract law, for diluting the mark by utilizing a similar
trademark in the assignee's area.
145
After reviewing the facts, the district court found "no evidence that
Warburton assigned its trademark to Multimin USA. ' 146 Moreover, the
court noted that the distribution agreement made clear that Multimin
USA was to be an exclusive distributor of the multimin product, not the
assignee of same. The court also acknowledged that while "the ICEE
court noted that a 'truly exclusive licensee' may constitute an assignee,
the [ICEE] court also made clear that 'an agreement that sets forth many
duties and rights between the parties that are inconsistent with an assign-
ment . . . does not constitute an assignment."'1 47 The Warburton-Mul-
timin USA distribution agreement contained several rights that




142. Id. at *3.
143. Id. at *5.
144. 325 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 2003).
145. Multimin, 2007 WL 1686511, at *3 (citing ICEE, 523 F.3d at 598).
146. Id. at *4.
147. Id. (citing ICEE, 325 F.3d at 598).
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Because an action under section 1114 of the Lanham Act may only be
brought by the registrant, and an action under section 1125(c) may only
be brought by the owner of the mark, the district court held that Mul-
timin USA had not shown that it had standing to sue the defendants for
federal trademark infringement or dilution.148 Also, because a common
law trademark infringement action under Texas law confers standing on
the registrant of the mark, Multimin USA did not have standing to bring
the Texas state law infringement claim. Accordingly, the district court
dismissed Multimin USA's claims against defendants. 149
B. CYBERSQUATYING
Cybersquatting is using a domain name with a bad faith intent to profit
from the goodwill of a trademark belonging to someone else. As the In-
ternet becomes more widely used in franchise and distribution arenas, we
can expect more litigation involving allegations of Cybersquatting. Dur-
ing this Survey period, the court in Pet Silk, Inc. v. Jackson1 50 analyzed
Cybersquatting in the Southern District of Texas.
Pet Silk, Inc. ("PSI") "is a Texas corporation in the business of selling
pet grooming products through distributors worldwide. ' ' 151 Beauty Elite
Group holds the registered trademark Pet Silk® and granted PSI the ex-
clusive license for use of the mark. PSI had been operating its website,
www.petsilk.com, for fifteen years. PSI's income was derived from online
distributors and pet supply retail stores, which consisted of approximately
40 to 50 [total] distributors. 1 52
Defendants Maria and Robert Jackson ran California-based MJM
Company, an approved distributor of Pet Silk® products. PSI com-
plained that MJM's website too closely resembled PSI's website. Moreo-
ver, MJM created a sub-distributor program on its website, which PSI did
not approve and asked MJM to remove. PSI experienced additional
problems with MJM related to MJM's alleged property rights to Pet
Silk® artwork and customer services issues. 153 In July 2006, PSI termi-
nated its relationship with MJM and no longer sold its Pet Silk® products
to MJM. 15 4 However, MJM continued selling Pet Silk® products secured
from other distributors. Following termination of the distributor agree-
ment, MJM still held itself out as a PSI distributor and maintained its
websites, www.petsilkonline.com and www.mjm-petsilk.com. 155  Al-
though MJM's website at www.petsilkonline.com informed customers
that Pet Silk® products would no longer be available at that site, the site
included a hyperlink that directed customers to the www.mjm-petsilk.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *5.
150. 481 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Tex. 2007).
151. Id. at 825.
152. Id. at 825.





corn site. The www.mjm-petsilk.com site, among other things, (i) listed
MJM companies that offered Pet Silk® products, (ii) contained photo-
graph of Pet Silk® bottles, and (iii) directed customers to pages to order
Pet Silk® products as well as products from two other pet grooming
lines.156
PSI filed a complaint against MJM and sought a preliminary injunction
to enjoin MJM from (1) using the Pet Silk® trade name in MJM's domain
names, (2) from holding itself out as PSI or as the manufacturer, main
distributor, licensee, or any similar relation to Pet Silk® products, and (3)
from entering into a distributor agreement where MJM would act as a
wholesaler. 15 7
The district court outlined the burden that PSI must meet for a prelimi-
nary injunction. In analyzing this type of Lanham Act claim, the court
noted that in cases where the alleged infringement involves a former li-
censee, the need for injunction becomes more compelling. 158
PSI sued MJM based on violations of the Lanham Act, sections 1114(1)
and 1125, which combine to protect owners of trademarks from infringe-
ment due to dilution and cyberpiracy. In addition, PSI claimed violations
of the Texas trademark and unfair competition statute, which is codified
as the Texas Business and Commerce Code section 16.26. The district
court analyzed the federal and state infringement laws together.
1 59
The district court first analyzed the elements of a trademark infringe-
ment claim: (1) whether PSI had a valid mark that was entitled to protec-
tion; and (2) whether the use of MJM's mark infringes, or is likely to
infringe, the mark of the plaintiff (based on a likelihood of confusion).
1 60
The court found that PSI met the first prong, because PSI's mark had
been registered since October 21, 1997. The district court then turned its
attention to the real question-whether there was a likelihood of confu-
sion. The court concluded that PSI "easily" met the second prong, be-
cause PSI had shown evidence of actual customer confusion.1 61 The court
disagreed with MJM's contention that the disclaimer on its web site elimi-
nated the chance of ongoing confusion. The district court held that "[a]
disclaimer disavowing affiliation with the trademark owner read by a con-
sumer after reaching the web site comes too late. 1 62 As such, the court
held that PSI met its burden to show likelihood of success on its trade-
mark infringement claim under the Lanham Act.
1 63
156. Id. at 827.
157. Id. at 828.
158. Id. (citing Sunward Elecs., Inc. v. McDonald, 362 F.3d 17, 25 (2d Cir. 2004)).
159. Id. at 828.
160. Id. at 829 (citing Estee Lauder, Inc. v. The Gap, Inc., 108 F.3d 1503, 1508 (2d Cir.
1997)).
161. Id. (citing Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 194 (5th Cir. 1998)
("Evidence of actual confusion [is] the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion.")).
162. Id. at 830 (citing PACCAR, Inc. v. TeleScan Tech., L.L.C., 319 F.3d 243, 250 (6th
Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds, KP Perm. Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,




Next, the district court considered PSI's claim for dilution. To prove
dilution, the court stated that PSI must prove that: (1) PSI's mark was
famous and distinctive; 164 (2) "MJM ... adopted the mark after the Pet
Silk® mark became famous"; and (3) "MJM caused a likelihood of dilu-
tion of the Pet Silk® mark. 16 5 Because the Pet Silk® mark had been
registered on the Principal Register of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office for the last fifteen years, MJM did not contest that
PSI's mark was famous. Neither did MJM contest that the Pet Silk®'s
name recognition in the pet supply and dog grooming market. Conse-
quently, the district court held that the mark met section 1125(c)(2)(A)'s
definition of famous. 166 The district court also held that the mark was
distinctive, because it was at least a suggestive mark (i.e., it required the
purchaser to use their imagination to reach a conclusion as to the nature
of the goods). 167
The district court presumed that MJM adopted the mark after it be-
came famous, because the mark had been registered for ten years and PSI
and MJM's distributorship relationship had begun only four years prior
to the filing of this action. To prove dilution, PSI argued (and the court
agreed) that the Pet Silk® mark had been diluted by blurring. 168 The
court noted that PSI satisfied the definition of blurring: "association aris-
ing from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.' 69 The marks
proved to be similar because, in fact, they were the same mark, as used in
MJM's web domain name. Therefore, the district court held that PSI had
presented sufficient evidence that it had a likelihood of success on its
federal dilution claim.170
PSI's final claim was for cyberpiracy or Cybersquatting. Under section
1125(d) of the Lanham Act:
(1)(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a
mark, including a personal name which is protected as a mark under
this section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties,
that person
(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark ... and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that
(II) in the case of a famous mark that is famous at the time of regis-
tration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to or
dilutive of that mark. 171
164. Id. The district court noted that the Texas anti-dilution statute only requires dis-
tinctiveness, not fame. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 16.29 (Vernon 2002).
165. Pet Silk, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 830.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 830-31 (noting that the law classifies marks into five different categories: "(1)
generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful)."
168. Id. at 831-32.
169. Id. at 831.
170. Id.
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000).
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MJM used two domain names, which the court stated were "at the very
least confusingly similar to the Pet Silk® mark."'1 72 The court also found
that MJM had the requisite bad faith based on a series of non-inclusive
factors:
* "MJM had no trademark or intellectual property rights in the Pet
Silk® mark";
* "MJM incorporated the entire famous trademark unchanged into
its domain names";
* "MJM did not use the Pet Silk® mark until it began selling Pet
Silk®'s products, so it [had] no bona fide prior use"; and
* "MJM [had] used the mark commercially with the intent to divert
customers to a site selling not only Pet Silk® products but competi-
tors' pet grooming products as well."'1
73
MJM did not argue one of the valid defenses to Cybersquatting (i.e.,
"that it believed that the use of the [Pet Silk®] mark was fair use or oth-
erwise lawful"). 174 Therefore, the district court held that PSI "made the
showing required by equity that its cyberpiracy claim [had] a likelihood of
success."175
In addition to likelihood of success on the merits of PSI's underlying
claims, the court found (and MJM did not contest) (i) irreparable injury
to PSI, (ii) no, or at least minimal, damages to MJM, and (iii) that the
public interest would be served by requiring compliance with Congres-
sional statutes such as the Lanham Act. Therefore, the court ordered a
preliminary injunction in favor of PSI. 176
VI. COMMON LAW CLAIM
A. CONTRACT ISSUES
As previously noted, Barrand was a franchise dispute between
Whataburger, Inc. and two of its franchisees. 177 Several franchisees be-
came disgruntled with Whataburger based on an "ostensibly improper re-
bate program" between Whataburger and several of its suppliers.
178
Following discovery of this rebate program, several franchisees, including
BurgerWorks, Inc., and Barrand, Inc., sued Whataburger seeking restitu-
tion and punitive damages for what they perceived to be an "illegal kick-
back scheme." However, "the parties settled before the suit reached
trial."' 79
172. Pet Silk, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
173. Id. at 833.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 834.
177. Barrand, Inc. v. Whataburger, Inc., 214 S.W.3d 122, 126-27 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2006, pet. denied).




Because each settlement involved a different franchise, a separate set-
tlement agreement existed between Whataburger and each franchisee.
Nevertheless, except for the settlement amounts, the terms and language
were nearly identical. The settlement agreements included (i) a cash re-
imbursement to the franchisees, and (ii) an agreement to amend existing
franchise agreements. Whataburger and the franchisees executed new
franchise agreements, with new terms. Pursuant to the new franchise
agreements, the franchisees were allowed to operate restaurants under an
initial ten-year period, with two, optional five-year renewal terms. 180
In 2002, Whataburger sued the franchisees under the settlement agree-
ments seeking a declaratory judgment from the court that it (i) "[had] no
legal obligation to grant any new franchise locations and/or franchise
agreements [under] the settlement agreements," (ii) "[had] no obligation
to grant new franchise agreements to the [franchisee] relative to their
current locations "at the expiration of their current terms, and (iii) "[had]
fulfilled all of its obligations under the Settlement Agreements." 181 The
franchisees filed counterclaims against Whataburger "for declaratory re-
lief, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, promissory estoppel, fraud, and negligent misrepresenta-
tion."'182 Whataburger moved for summary judgment, arguing that the
summary judgment would dispose of all claims and counterclaims. 83
In addition to BurgerWorks and Barrand's responses to Whataburger's
motion for summary judgment, Barrand filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment, requesting that the court declare that the settlement agreement
must be read to request that Whataburger not unreasonably withhold its
consent to new franchise locations that the franchisees request under the
provisions of the new franchise agreements. The trial court granted
Whataburger's motion and denied Barrand's motion. BurgerWorks and
Barrand appealed.1 84
BurgerWorks and Barrand contended that the settlement agreement
and new franchise agreements "obligat[ed] Whataburger to renew the
franchise agreements for existing restaurants and to grant requests for
new franchise locations that [were] reasonable."' 185
In analyzing the summary judgment on Whataburger's request for de-
claratory relief, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals recited that "[t]he
interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the
court to decide. 1 86 On the other hand, "[w]hen a contract contains an
ambiguity (which is a question of law), the granting of a motion for sum-





184. Id. at 128.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 129.
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is a question of fact for the jury."187 "[A] contract is ambiguous only if
two or more meanings are genuinely possible after application of the per-
tinent rules of interpretation to the face of the instrument," not because
the parties may offer conflicting interpretations.]88
The court of appeals analyzed the provisions of the new franchise
agreement pertaining specifically to the term and renewal, of the existing
restaurants. The court of appeals concluded that these provisions gave
"the franchisees the option to renew their contracts, but that they did not
contemplate perpetual renewal.189 The court further noted that under
the new franchise agreements, Whataburger did not have a right to refuse
contract renewal; Whataburger was "obligated to extend the [new
franchise agreements] upon written notice . . . without consent or ap-
proval from Whataburger."' 190
The court of appeals disagreed with BurgerWorks and Barrand's inter-
pretation of the new franchise agreement that the renewal option ex-
tended more than ten years. Reading each new franchise agreement as a
whole, the court held that the agreements "[did] not contemplate an
open-ended, indefinite duration."' 9' To read the new franchise agree-
ments as BurgerWorks and Barrand desired, the court held that it would
need to effectively nullify the renewal provisions. The court was unwill-
ing to do this because this result would be unreasonable and contrary to
the express intent of the settlement agreement and new franchise agree-
ments.192 The court of appeals concluded that the settlement agreement
and new franchise agreements were unambiguous, and worded so that
they [could] be given a definite and certain legal meaning. '193
BurgerWorks and Barrand next argued that the new franchise agree-
ments provided for new restaurants. They argued that although there
was no clause or provision expressly granting a right to new franchise
locations, "the reasonableness clause in the Settlement Agreement oper-
ate[d] to give them such a right. ' 194 The court held that while the settle-
ment agreement did contemplate new franchise restaurants,
BurgerWorks and Barrand did not have a contractual right to new restau-
rants. 195 The court noted a critical distinction. Although the settlement
agreement stated that all new franchise agreements shall contain the
same terms as those in the settlement agreement, the settlement agree-
ment did not state that Whataburger was obligated to execute new con-
tracts for new restaurants. Therefore, the court affirmed Whataburger's
summary judgment on that issue.196
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 130.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 131.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 132.
195. Id. at 132-33.
196. Id. at 136.
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Next, the court addressed whether Whataburger fulfilled its obligations
under the settlement agreement. BurgerWorks and Barrand argued that
Whataburger had a continuing obligation to renew contracts for existing
restaurants and to execute new contracts for new restaurants. As ana-
lyzed above, the court held that executing new contracts, whether for old
or new restaurants, was not a continuing obligation for Whataburger
under the settlement agreement.' 97 In addition, the court opposed Bar-
rand's argument that it was entitled to new restaurants outside of its de-
fined development area under its area development agreement. 19 8 The
court of appeals concluded that Whataburger was entitled to declaratory
judgment as a matter of law on that ground. 199
The court of appeals next addressed Barrand's counterclaims. The
court first concluded that the trial court did not err in granting summary
judgment to Whataburger on Barrand's request for declaratory judg-
ment.2 00  Because the trial court had properly determined that
Whataburger was not obligated to renew contracts for existing restau-
rants or to enter new contract for restaurants, summary judgment to
Whataburger was proper. 20 1 Based on this conclusion, the court held that
summary judgment to Whataburger was also proper on Barrand's breach
of contract claim.20
2
The appellate court further confirmed a long-standing rule in Texas: the
common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing does not extend to all
franchise agreements because "a franchisor does not exert control over
its franchisee's business comparable to the control an insurer exerts over
its insured's claim."'20 3 The court held that summary judgment was
proper on this good faith claim because: (1) the Texas Supreme Court had
specifically declined to extend the duty of good faith and fair dealing to
all franchise agreements; and (2) to the extent that such a duty was cre-
ated by the parties' relationship, the court did not have any legal author-
ity or logical basis for concluding that the duty obligated Whataburger to
enter new contracts or to extend the contract indefinitely.
2 0 4
Barrand based its claims for promissory estoppel, intentional misrepre-
sentation, and negligence on an alleged oral promise by Whataburger
that "so long as Barrand met the otherwise objective criteria for store
development, Whataburger would not unreasonably withhold its consent
to Barrand's requests to develop additional Whataburger restaurants.
20 5
After outlining the elements for each of these claims, the court of appeals
only addressed the statute of frauds ground for summary judgment, not
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 137-38.
200. Id. at 138.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 139.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 140.
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the failure to establish justifiable reliance.206
Whataburger contended that Barrand's claims failed because they re-
lied on a promise that could not be performed within a year. Barrand
claimed that Whataburger had failed to present any evidence that the
agreement could not be performed within one year. However, the court
focused on Barrand's own pleadings rather than Whataburger's evidence.
Based on Barrand's live pleading, Barrand alleged facts that affirmatively
demonstrated that the alleged oral contract could not have been and was
not in fact performed within one year.20 7 Barrand pled that Whataburger
first made the oral promise in 1994, and again in 1998, but that the first
incident to give rise to a breach occurred in each 2001. Taking Barrand's
allegations as true; the agreement was not allegedly breached until seven
years after the promise was made. Therefore, Barrand's pleadings "put
the agreement squarely within the statute of frauds. '20 8 The appellate
court concluded that the trial court did not err in granting summary judg-
ment to Whataburger on all claims.20 9
When parties exchange several documents and do not memorialize
their agreement in a final, signed writing, the issue of whether a contract
exists often arises. This makes a breach of contract claim a little more
complicated. In Terex Corp. v. Cubex Ltd.,210 Cubex Ltd. ("Cubex") was
the manufacturer of mining equipment and Terex Corp. ("Turex") was a
distributor.211 The parties' distributorship agreement was executed in
1995, and it required that the parties provide a 90-day notice prior to any
termination, and also granted Terex exclusive rights to distribute Cubex
products worldwide, except for Canada. Despite this geographic exclu-
sion, Terex, through its subsidiary Reedrill, began and continued to dis-
tribute products in Canada.212
In 2002, Cubex and Terex exchanged a series of documents in an at-
tempt to establish their then-existing relationship in writing. The terms of
negotiations included: (i) permitting Terex to distribute in Canada, except
for the "Marathon section," (ii) requiring that the parties could terminate
only for cause; and (iii) a right of the non-terminating party to cure its
deficiency. However, although the 2002 final draft was sent to Cubex,
Cubex did not sign it.213
In May 2006, Cubex gave Terex 90-days' notice that Cubex would ter-
minate the distributorship agreement. Terex filed suit and sought a tem-
porary restraining order and preliminary injunction to enjoin the
termination of the distributorship agreement. The district court denied
206. Id. at 141.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 142.
209. Id. at 147.
210. No. 3:06-CV-1639-G, 2006 WL 3542706 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2006).





Terex's request for the temporary restraining order. 214
In considering Terex's request for the preliminary injunction, the court
of appeals analyzed whether Terex had proven a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of Terex's breach of contract claim. Terex alleged
that Cubex breached the distributorship agreement because Cubex failed
to provide a cause for termination or an opportunity to cure the defi-
ciency. Terex argued that these elements would only be required if the
parties had amended the 1995 agreement through the 2002 negotiations,
which Cubex argued that they did not.215 Conversely, Terex argued that
the terms of the 2002 negotiations amended the 1995 agreement through
the parties course of performance. As such, the question for the court
was whether had Terex presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a
likelihood of success on its contention that the terms discussed during the
2002 negotiations were incorporated into the 1995 agreement and that
Cubex had breached those additional terms. 2
1 6
For two reasons, the district court held that Terex had not shown a
substantial likelihood of success on its breach of contract claim.217 The
district court initially acknowledged that the distributorship agreement
was governed by the Texas Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") because
the sale of goods was the dominant factor in distributorship contracts.
218
The court noted that although the UCC required modifications to a con-
tract to be in writing and signed, a party could waive the signed writing
requirement if that party attempted to modify the contract in a manner
that did not satisfy the provision.219 Terex argued that Cubex's course of
performance proved that Cubex had accepted the terms of the 2002 nego-
tiations. Terex pointed out that it sold products in Canada following the
2002 negotiations pursuant to the terms of the amended agreement.
However, the district court found that the sale of products in Canada was
not a change in Terex's performance because Terex had been selling
Cubex products in Canada for years.220 Therefore, the district court was
unable to identify any change in the course of performance sufficient to
indicate a waiver by Cubex of the signed writing requirement.
Second, the district court found that Terex could not meet the statute
of frauds requirement of a signature by the party against whom enforce-
ment was sought.221 The court evaluated whether Terex had established
the "merchant exception" to the UCC signature requirement:
214. Id. at *2.
215. Id. at *3.
216. Id. at *4.
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing Cont'l Casing Corp. v. Siderca Corp., 38 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.)).
219. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.209(b) and (d) (Vernon 1994).
220. Terex Corp., 2006 WL 3542706, at *4.
221. Id. at *5; see also TEX Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(a ) (Vernon 1994) (A
contract governed by the UCC calling for a "sale of goods for the price of $500 or more"
must be in writing "and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought.").
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if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract
and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it
has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the [signed writing re-
quirement] against such party unless written notice of objection to its
contents is given within ten days after it is received. 222
The court held that the 2002 final draft from Terex to Cubex did not con-
stitute a "confirmation" because it contemplated, on its face, further dis-
cussions of the terms.2 23 The 2002 draft stated that some arrangements
needed to be cleared up and that the draft was for Cubex to review for
discussion. As such, the writing was not a confirmation of previously ne-
gotiated terms, but was instead an on-going step in an active negotia-
tion.224 Therefore, the district court held that at that stage of litigation,
Terex had not proven "a substantial likelihood that [it would] succeed on
the merits of its breach of contract claim. '225 For this and other reasons,
the district court denied Terex's request for a preliminary injunction.2 2 6
B. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
Often, a court will look to the terms of a license or franchise agreement
for the scope of control that the licensor or franchisor exercises over the
licensee or franchisee to determine whether a case of vicarious liability
exists. Trevor Townsend ("Trevor") was an employee of Prine, Inc.
("Prine"), "a licensed dealer of Goodyear tires operating under a Dealer
Agreement and a Service Mark License. '227 Trevor was killed in an acci-
dent while changing tires on a motor home. Charles Trent Townsend and
Jackie Townsend (collectively, the "Townsends") sued Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. ("Goodyear"), alleging that Goodyear negligently exercised
control over Trevor's training and the safety of his workplace. Because
Goodyear was the licensor, the trial court held that as a matter of law,
Goodyear had no duty to Prine's employees under its contractual ar-
rangement with Prine.2 28 The Townsends appealed.
The Fifth Circuit noted Texas law regarding independent contractor:
"[o]ne who retains the right of control or exercises actual control over the
work of an independent contractor also owes a duty of reasonable care to
the contractor's employees. '229 The court further noted that, "[f]or liabil-
ity there must be 'a nexus between the employer's duty of care and its
right of control." 230 The Townsends argued that the dealer and license
222. TEX Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201(b) (Vernon 21994).
223. Terex Corp., 2006 WL 3542706, at *5.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at *14.
227. Townsend v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 249 F. App'x 327, 328 (5th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam).
228. Id.
229. Id. (citing Exxon Corp. v. Tidwell, 867 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1993)).
230. Id. (quoting Hoechst-Celanese Corp. v. Mendex, 967 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. 1998)
("The more detailed the right of control over the independent contractor's work, the
greater the employer's responsibility for any resulting injuries.")).
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agreement between Prine and Goodyear created a contractual duty to
Trevor because Goodyear retained control over the work, thus making
Goodyear vicariously liable. Moreover, the Townsends argued that
Goodyear's advertising was indicative of its control because of statements
touting the high standards of its retailers.2
31
The Fifth Circuit noted that "[a] general contractor will be liable for an
independent contractor's acts if the contract gives it 'the right to control
the means, methods, or details of the independent contractor's work."
232
In reviewing the license agreement at issue, the Fifth Circuit highlighted
that: (i) "Goodyear had the right to ensure its automotive standards were
being met;" (ii) "Prine's employees were adequately trained"; and (iii)
"Goodyear [had] the right to inspect the premises. '233 However, "[t]he
focus of the contract [was] Goodyear's general right of control over
Prine's operations in relation to the quality and standards of service...
rather than the specific right of control over the safety and training of
Prine's employees. '234
The license agreement did not provide specific safety requirements, nor
was Goodyear required to do so by any contractual provision. Also,
Prine was required to train its employees, but it was not required to use
Goodyear's services for the training. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held
that "[t]he district court correctly determined that Goodyear did not have
a duty to Trevor as Prine's employee. '235
VII. STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. TEXAS DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
In CK DFW Partners Ltd. v. City Kitchens, Inc,2 3 6 the Northern District
of Texas addressed the argument that the forum selection and/or choice
of law clauses found in a franchise agreement were invalid because they
contravened public policy by effectively constituting a waiver of the
DTPA. The relevant franchise agreements provided that California law
applied to disputes between the parties and that any claims between the
parties would be brought in California state court.237 The court applied
federal law to determine whether the forum selection clause mandated
that the case be dismissed for improper venue.238 Under the federal stan-
dard, two factors the court considers in evaluating forum selection clauses
are whether the selected forum presents a "grave inconvenience," or
whether enforcement of the clause would "contravene a strong public
231. Id.




236. No. 3:06-CV-1598-D, 2007 WL 2381259, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2007).
237. Id.
238. Id. at *2.
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policy of the forum state. '239
The franchisee plaintiffs argued that enforcement of the California
choice-of-law provision would result in a waiver of the Texas DTPA,
which, in general, cannot be waived. 240 The plaintiffs also argued that if
the defendants' motion to dismiss was granted, they would be denied pro-
tection under the relevant California franchise laws as well because those
laws do not apply to out-of-state franchisees. 241 The defendants coun-
tered that California courts would apply California franchise laws to
plaintiffs' franchises because of the choice-of-law provision combined
with the fact that the defendants registered the franchise offering in Cali-
fornia, and that honoring the choice-of-law provision would not result in
any violation of Texas public policy. 242
The court held that "the mere deprivation of a right to sue under the
DTPA is not a sufficient basis for holding enforcement of a forum selec-
tion or choice-of-law clause unreasonable. '243 The court further found
that the plaintiffs did not establish that the California franchise laws
would not apply to their franchises, but even if they did not apply, the
plaintiffs, "failed to show how such a denial supports the conclusion that
enforcement of the forum selection and/or choice-of-law clauses would
contravene a strong Texas public policy." 244
B. ANTITRUST
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court reversed a ninety-six year
old precedent in Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.245 re-
lating to vertical minimum-resale-price agreements. Leegin Creative
Leather Products ("Leegin") designs, manufactures, and distributes
leather goods and accessories for women.246 PSKS operates a women's
apparel store that sold Leegin's products.247 Leegin instituted a policy
refusing to sell to retailers that discounted below its suggested prices. 248
PSKS sued, alleging that Leegin's policy violated antitrust law by consti-
tuting a vertical minimum-price-fixing agreement. 249
Supreme Court precedent had long held that vertical minimum-price-
fixing agreements such as the one at issue in Leegin were a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act.250 After analyzing the relevant precedent, the
Court concluded that the reasoning that the precedent was based upon
239. Id.




244. ld. at 8.
245. 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2705 (2007).
246. Id. at 2710.
247. Id. at 2711.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 2712.
250. Id. at 2713.
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did not justify a per se rule.25 1 The Court noted that stare decisis has less
effect in a Sherman Act case because the Court has traditionally treated
the Sherman Act as a "common law" statute with evolving standards.
2 52
The Court examined relevant economics literature and determined that,
"[v]ertical agreements establishing minimum resale prices can have either
procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circum-
stances in which they are formed. ' 25 3 The Court rejected the argument
that a per se rule is appropriate due to administrative convenience.
254
The Court held that vertical price restraints are now to be judged by the
rule of reason. 255 This rule requires the factfinder to take into account all
the circumstances of the case in determining whether a particular re-
straint is unlawful, including information about the businesses involved
and the restraint's nature and effect.
256
Another significant antitrust decision has recently come from the Texas
Supreme Court. In Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 2 5 7 five soft
drink bottlers with franchises to distribute Royal Crown Cola sued The
Coca-Cola Company and several Coca-Cola and Dr. Pepper distributors
asserting various antitrust violations, including a violation of the Texas
Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983 ("TFEAA"). The plaintiffs
distributed Royal Crown Cola in various territories within the region
where the Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas borders meet, including part of
southeast Oklahoma.2 58 The plaintiffs alleged that Coca-Cola violated
the antitrust laws by its calendar marketing agreements ("CMAs") with
retailers. 259 These agreements can vary, but all essentially provide that
"during stated periods of time a retailer will promote a wholesaler's prod-
ucts in preference to competing products in exchange for payments and
price discounts from the wholesaler. '260 The Royal Crown Cola franchis-
ees argued that Coca-Cola was attempting to monopolize their markets
by using very aggressive CMAs with retailers that had no choice but to
accept, given Coca-Cola's market power.
2 61
The jury granted a verdict for the plaintiffs. 2 62 The court of appeals
affirmed the verdict, rejecting Coca-Cola's argument that the trial court
"should not have awarded damages and injunctive relief under the
TFEAA for conduct that occurred outside Texas. ' 263 The court of ap-
peals also held that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that
251. Id. at 2713-14.
252. Id. at 2721-22.
253. Id. at 2717.
254. Id. at 2718.
255. Id. at 2725.
256. Id. at 2712-13.
257. 218 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tex. 2006).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 676.
261. Id. at 676-77.
262. Id. at 678.
263. Id. at 679.
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the CMAs sufficiently restricted trade.264
The supreme court reversed the court of appeals. 265 The supreme
court held that the Texas legislature did not intend for the TFEAA to
allow damages and injunctive relief for injuries that occur in other
states.2 66 The supreme court noted that the plaintiffs did not argue that
compensation for their injuries suffered in other states would "promote
competition in Texas or benefit Texas consumers. ' ' 26 7 The supreme court
held that TFEAA does not apply to conduct that occurs outside of Texas
just because the same type of conduct occurred inside of Texas and
caused the same type of harm.268 Therefore, the plaintiffs' complaints of
injury outside of Texas were not actionable under the TFEAA.269
The supreme court further held that the trial court should not have
allowed the plaintiffs to assert claims under Arkansas, Louisiana, and
Oklahoma law.2 70 The plaintiffs did not attempt to show that those
states' antitrust statutes were substantially similar to the TFEAA, and the
supreme court held that it would not presume that they were.27 1 The
supreme court stated that, "[f]or a court in one state to undertake to de-
termine what would benefit competition and consumers in another state
would pose a significant affront to the interstate comity sister states
should accord each other in our federal system. '272 The supreme court
noted that "refusal to entertain an action based on another state's anti-
trust law does not deprive the plaintiff of a forum" because the plaintiff
can sue in the other state's courts.2 7 3
Finally, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs had failed to provide
evidence sufficient to show a "demonstrable economic effect. '274 The su-
preme court stated that, "since there is evidence only that [Coca-Cola's]
CMAs could have had an adverse effect on competition in a relevant
market, not that they actually did, existence of the CMAs alone cannot
prove [Coca-Cola] engaged in predatory or anticompetitive conduct. '275
Therefore, the supreme court held that the plaintiffs had failed to show
any antitrust violation. 276
C. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
In Bennigan's Franchising Co. v. Swigonski, the plaintiffs, Bennigan's
franchising entities, sought to enforce a non-competition agreement
264. Id.
265. Id. at 691.
266. Id. at 682.
267. Id. at 683.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 684.
270. Id. at 688.
271. Id. at 684-85.
272. Id. at 685.
273. Id. at 686.
274. Id. at 689.




against a former franchisee that had de-identified as a Bennigan's, but
continued to operate as a restaurant.277 New York law applied to the
case. 278 New York law upholds covenants not to compete against former
franchisees only if they are "reasonable in geographic scope and dura-
tion."'279 The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enforce the
covenant not to compete, arguing that former franchisees should not be
allowed to "operate restaurants as a Bennigan's but putting other names
on them."'280 The court held that because the nearest Bennigan's was
over two hundred miles away and the defendants were not still using
Bennigan's protected trademarks, the covenant not to compete "is more
limiting than would be required to protect the plaintiffs' legitimate busi-
ness interests."'28 1 Furthermore, the court held that the covenant lan-
guage, which prohibited operating or being involved with "'any casual
dining or other restaurant business ... that is in any way competitive with
or similar to a Bennigan's Restaurant,"' was unreasonably restrictive.
282
Specifically, the court stated that the franchise agreement did not define
"casual dining" or provide any other means to determine its definition.283
The court denied the request for a preliminary injunction.
284
277. No. 3:06-CV-2300-G, 2007 WL 603370, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2007).
278. Id. at *2.
279. Id.
280. Id. at *5.
281. Id. at *3.
282. Id.
283. Id. at *4.
284. Id. at *5.
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